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Ii'l THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

NATHAN J. HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant Nathan J. Hill was charged with delinquency
based upon two counts of burglary in that he unlawfully
remained in a building with intent to commit theft, in
violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated,

(1953)

as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Merrill L. Hermansen of the Third
District Juvenile Court accepted an admission on both counts
of the charge.

Appellant later moved to withdraw the

admission and enter a denial.

That motion was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant requests that the judgment be vacated
and the case be remanded to the lower court with instructions to withdraw the admission and to allow the Appellant
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to enter a denial of the charge.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 30, 1980 Nathan J. Hill, a juvenile,
appeared with his father and a probation officer before
the Honorable Merrill L. Hermansen of the Third District
Juvenile Court.

At that time he was informed that he was

charged with two counts of unlawfully remaining in a
building with intent to commit theft.

Appellant and his

father had been told by juvenile court probation personnel
that an immediate admission would expedite his being
placed on a release program to his parent.

Appellant's

father, upon whom Appellant depended for counsel in this
matter, understood the offense to be equivalent to trespass
and as a result Appellant did not fully understand the
charge.

Appellant and his father were told nothing about

the range of possible punishments but only that it was a
serious charge.

The court informed Appellant that he had

a right to discuss the charge with legal counsel before
pleading.

Nathan indicated that he did not wish to consult

counsel and entered an admission.
the decision.

His father concurred in

The court accepted the admission to two

felony counts of burglary in violation of Section 16-6-202,
Utah Code Annotated

(1953) as amended.

The Appellant through cou~sel later appearing in
the case moved the court to withdraw the admission and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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allow the entry of a denial of the charge and to set the
matter for trial.

That motion was denied May 20, 1980 by

Judge Hermansen.
ARGUMENT
SINCE APPELLANT DID NOT MAKE A VOLUNTARY AND
INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE
COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING HIS ADMISSION AND
ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
THAT ADMISSION.
The Appellant contends that owing to his age, a
lack of information, and the suggestion by the court's
probation officer that an immediate admission would be in
his best interest, he was not in a position to make an
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

It is clear

that a person charged with a felony has an unconditional
and absolute constitutional right to have a lawyer.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d
799 (1963).

It is also clear that the right attaches at

the pleading stage of the criminal process. Rice v. Olson,
324 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367 (1945).

The

question in the present case is whether the appellant was
adequately instructed and informed by the court to intelligently waive that right.

Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.

506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) ·
In the case of Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458,

38 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), the Supreme Court laid
down the standard for waiver of the accused's right to
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It has been pointed out that "courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver"
of fundamental constitutional rights and that
we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily a
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege.
The determination of whether there
has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel
must depend, in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused.
304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023.
In the present case there are several factors which militate
against a finding of waiver.
Appellant's age.

The first such factor is the

While it is true that the accused's

minority does not necessarily preclude a finding of voluntary waiver, the general rule is that judges should approacl
with particular caution any waiver by juveniles.
case of Williams v. Huff, 146 F.2d 867

In the

(D.C. Cir. 1945) a

17-year-old accused entered an uncounseled guilty plea to
a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, committed when he
was 15 years of age.

The record showed that the defendant

had been advised of his constitutional right to a lawyer
which he had expressly waived.

The defendant testified

t~t

he had been advised by fellow prisoners that a guilty plea
would improve his chances for probation.

In holding that

there had been no proper waiver the court said:
But in this case the fact that appellant was 17
years old at the time of the plea corroborates
his testimony.
It creates an inference of fact
that his waiver was not intelligent.
Such an
inference would be rebutted if the record showed
that he was examined at the time of his plea on
the question of his intelligent capacity to waive
-4-
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his constitutional right to counsel.
Such a
precaution is always advisable where the accused
who waives his right to counsel is a minor.
In
the absence of such a record it is incumbent upon
the government to show some other facts which
rebut the inference arising from the age of the
accused.
146 F.2d at 868.
The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning in
Williams in the case of Moorev. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78
S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed 2d 167

(1957).

The defendant had entered

a hasty guilty plea partly out of fear of possible violence
directed against him.

The court said:

A rejection of federal constitutional rights
motivated by fear cannot, in the circumstances
of this case, constitute an intelligent waiver.
This conclusion against an intelligent waiver is
fortified by the inferences which may be drawn
from the age of the petitioner, Williams v. Huff
355 U.S. at 165, 78 S.Ct. at 197.
The inference against waiver established by the
~ppellant's

minority is strengthened by the fact that he

was not adequately informed as to the nature of the charge
and was not instructed at all as to the possible consequences of pleading guilty.

The charge itself was read to

Nathan but not further explained.

Nathan's father, upon

whom Nathan was relying for counsel, understood the offense
to be equivalent to trespass.

The exact title and section

of the Utah Code was not read, the court relying rather on
cc he Appellant's finding that information in the summons.
The Appellant was told nothing as to the punishment but was
only told generally that the charge was a serious one.

-5-
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The Supreme Court in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332

u.s.

708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed 309 (1947), outlined the responsibility of the trial judge in properly instructing the
accused.

In that case the court stated:
To discharge this duty properly in light of the
strong presumption against waiver of the
constitutional right to counsel, a judge must
investigate as long and as thoroughly as the
circumstances of the case before him demand. The
fact that an accused may tell him that he is
informed of his right to counsel and desires to
waive this right does not automatically end the
Judge's responsibility.
To be valid such a waiver
must be made with an apprehension of the nature
of the charges, the statutory offenses included
within them, the range of allowable punishments
thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and
circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other
factors essential to a broad understanding of the
whole matter. A judge can make certain that an
accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating
and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered. 332
U.S. at 724, 68 S.Ct. at 323.

The judge's conduct in the present case clearly did not
meet the constitutional standard.

The court did only that

which the Supreme Court rejected as less than sufficient-tell the accused he could have a lawyer if he wished and
then accept his stated waiver.
The judge's acceptance of Appellant's plea also runs
afoul of Utah State statute.

Section 77-24-6, Utah Code

Annotated (1953) as amended, which was in effect at all
times pertinent to the present case, states:

-6-
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Plea of guilty - Court to explain consequences.
- Where the defendant is not represented by
counsel, the court shall not accept a plea of
guilty until it shall have explained to the
defendant the consequences of such plea.
Section 77-35-11 of the new Criminal Procedure Code
effective July 1, 1980 preserves the essential import of
the previous statute but provides greater detail as to the
judge's responsibility.

The new statute states:

(e)
The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty on no contest and shall not accept such
a plea until the court has made the findings:
(1)
That if the defendant is not represented
by counsel he has knowingly waived his right to
counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2)
That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3)
That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury
trial and to confront and cross examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by
entering a plea he waives all those rights;
(4)
That the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is entering
a plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have
the burden of proving each of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(5)
That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him
for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of imposition of consecutive sentences
In State v. Banford, 13 Utah 2d 63, 368 P.2d 473
(1962) this CJurt reversed a conviction in a case strikingly
similar to the present one for noncompliance with the 1953
statute.

The defendant in Banford

a charge of Second Degree Burglary.

had pleaded guilty to
At the time he entered

his plea, the Court told him that he was entitled to have
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counsel and that he could delay entering his plea 48 hours
to secure counsel.

The defendant said he did not want a

lawyer and entered his plea immediately.

This Court cited

Section 77-24-6 and remended the case with instructions to
withdraw the plea and allow the case to go to trial.
The trial court's failures are not rendered harmless
by the fact that the juvenile may have had previous experience in the courts.
Appeals

The U.S. 10th Circuit Court of

in Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1965)

made it clear that experience is only one of several
factors to be considered in deciding whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of a right to counsel.
Appellee (the State) made little or no attempt
to make a record sufficient to refute the oral
testimony of appellant.
We disagree with the
trial court's finding that because this accused
has been involved in previous criminal cases, it
is to be inferred that he possessed all of the
requisite understanding and intelligence to
waive his right to counsel.
That may be a fact
to be given consideration with all of the other
facts and circumstances in the case, but standing
alone it is not sufficient.
350 F.2d at 912
CONCLUSION
The Appellant submits that the court erred in
accepting Appellant's guilty plea to two counts of burglary
without his having legal counsel.

The court should have

been alerted to particular caution before accepting any
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights because of the
Appellant's age.

Failure to thoroughly inform the
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Appellant as to the nature of the charge and the range
of possible punishments before accepting his uncounseled
plea was in violation of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court and by Utah Statute.

Under

all the facts of the case this Court should remand with
instructions to withdraw the plea and award the Appellant
a trial.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J.
Attorney f

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed 11 copies of the
foregoing Brief Of Appellant, to the Utah Supreme Court,
State Capitol, salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and 3 copies of
the same to the Office of the Utah Attorney General at
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
day of August, 1980.
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